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NOTE AND COMMENT
seems to contemplate such in its statute providing that no suit
shall be brought against devisees and legatees to contribute
to payment of a claim by excepting from the operation thereof,
creditors whose claims were not due ten months before the
day of settlement or whose claims were contingent and did
not become absolute ten months before such day."
It is believed that good legislation on this point should
provide that: All absolute claims whether matured or unma-
tured, liquidated or unliquidated, shall be presented within
ten months or be forever barred. Claims which are contingent
as of the date of death of the deceased and which become ab-
solute within the ten month's period shall be presented as
fixed claims or be forever barred. If such contingent claims
become absolute after the ten month period but before the
estate is settled, they may be presented as a claim against
the estate subject to the right of the personal representative
to reject the claim on the ground of undue delay and embar-
rassment to him in the final administration of the estate. If
such contingent claims becoming absolute after the ten month
period are presented and rejected or if not presented to the
administrator, suit may be brought against the heirs, devisees
and legatees, each being held according to the proportion of
the decedent's property each received.
DONALD E. RONISH.
"R.C.M. 1935, 10314. When the accounts of the administrator or execu-
tor have been settled, and an order made for the payment of debts and
distribution of the estate, no creditor, whose claim was not included
in the order for payment, has any right to call upon the creditors who
have been paid, or upon the heirs, devisees, or legatees, to contribute
to the payment of his claim; but if the executor or administrator has
failed to give the notice to the creditors, as prescribed in section 10171,
such creditor may recover on the bond of the executor or administrator
the amount of his claim or such part thereof as he would have been
entitled to, had it been allowed. This section shall not apply to any
creditor whose claim was not due ten months before the day of settle-
ment, or whose claim was contingent, and did not become absolute ten
months before such day
EFFECT OF PRIOR CONTRADITORY STATEMENTS
IN IMPEACHMENT
The unorthodox view,' that prior self-contradictory state-
ments are not only admissable for impeachment purposes but also
as evidence of the fact contained in the prior statement, was
adopted by the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Jolly."
The defendant was being prosecuted for receiving stolen
'3 WIGmomo, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §1018, p. 687.2(1941) 112 Mont. 352, 116 P(2d) 686. -:
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property. The only evidence bearing on the defendant's
knowledge that the property had been stolen was testimony
of one witness presented by the state. In answer to the coun-
ty attorney's question relating to the stolen property, "Did
you ever hear Mr. Jolly say that it was hot and that you would
have to be careful," the witness answered, "I don't recollect
that. I don't remember."
With leave of court the prosecution cross-examined the
witness and an affidavit made by the witness about three
months beforethe trial was admitted without objection or ef-
fort to limit its evidentiary effect. In the affidavit the wit.
ness stated that the defendant, Jolly, had in the spring of 1939,
told him that the property was "hot" and that they-would
have to be careful.
Though the statement in court was not a direct denial of
the previous statement, the court discussed the nature and ef-
fect of impeachment at length. A special concurring opinion
by one justice agreed with the result reached in the case but
not with the views expressed regarding the effect of impeach-
ment by the balance of the court.
A leading authority' has discussed at length the historical
development of the right to impeach one's own witness. In the
primative modes of trial it was inconceivable that one should
be allowed to dispute what his own chosen witness has said.'
Today the rule is well established that the party on whose be-
half a witnes appears can impeach that witness in certain
ways.'
Under the Montana Statutes' he may not be impeached by
evidence of bad character, but a proof of prior inconsistent
statements is allowed under some circumstances. The circum-
stances under which such impeachment is permissible have
SWIMoREz EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §896 through §900.
'3 WImwao, EvIDmcE (3d ed. 1940) §896, p. 383.
'3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed, 1940) §896, p. 383.
6R.C.M. 1935, §10666. "The party producing a witness is not allowed to
impeach his credit by evidence of bad character, but he may contradict
him by other evidence, and may also show that he has made at other
times statements inconsistent with his present testimony as provided
in §10669."
R.C.M. 1935 §10669. "A witness may also be impeached by evidence
that he has made, at other times statements, inconsistent with his
present testimony, but before this can be done the statements must be
related to him, with the circumstance of times, places and persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if
so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing, they must
be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning
them."
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been stated in several Montana cases." The construction given
by the Calfiornia Supreme Court to the California code sec-
tions, which were adopted in Montana,* was approved by the
Montana Supreme Court in State v. Richardson.' The Court
in the same case, citing two other Montana cases, ° stated:
"We think under the express terms of this statute" the
state has the right to cross-examine one of its own wit-
nesses where it satisfactorily appears that the evidence has
taken the county attorney by surprise, and is contrary to
the examination of such witness preparatory to the trial,
or what the prosecuting attorney had reason to believe the
witness would testify to."
One case' indicates the mere failure to testify to a mate-
rial fact as expected is not sufficient, but, in addition to show-
ing surprise, the witness must have given testimony hurtful to
the party calling him. Though the county attorney was, on
the day before the trial, apprised of the fact that the witness
was unfriendly to the state, still his claim of surprise was al-
lowed." In this latter case the Court stated:
"If the element of surprise be deemed material, we think
it need not be confined to what develops after the witness
takes the stand. No such narrow construction of the
statute is permissible. The purpose of the statute' is to
elicit the truth. This . ..must be reposed in the sound
discretion of the court."
The orthodox view' as to the effect to be given prior con-
tradictory statements, has been stated as follows.'
'State v. Kinghorn (1939) 109 Mont. 22, 938 P. (2d) 964;
State v. Clark (1930) 87 Mont 416, 288 P. 186;
State v. Richardson (1922) 63 Mont. 322, 209 P. 124;
State v. Willette (1912) 46 Mont. 326, 127 P. 1013;
State v. Bloor (1898) 20 Mont. 574, 52 P. 611.
"State v. Kinghorn, see note 7, Supra.
'See note 7. Supra, "In construing these sections, the Supreme Court
of California has held that. before a party calling a witness could
impeach him. it must be shown that the party by whom the witness
has been produced has been mislead and taken by surprise, that he had
reason to believe the witness would give testimony favorable to him;
and that a party under a guise of this rule cannot present to the jury
mere hearsay declarations."
"State v. Willette, State v. Bloor, See note 7, Supra.
UR.C.M. 1935, §10666, See note 6 supra.
"State v. Kinghorn, See note 7, Supra.
"State v. Clark. See Note 7, Supra.
"R.C.M. 1935, §10666, See note 6, Supra.
u3 WxMOR, EVIDENCE (3d ed 1940) §1018, p. 687.
"See note 15, Supra.
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"It is the repugnancy of his evidence that discredits him,
obviously the prior self-contradiction is not used assertive-
ly; i.e., we are not asked to believe his prior statement as
testimony and we do not have to choose between the two
• ..We simply set the two against each other, perceive
that both cannot be correct, and immediately conclude
that he has erred in one or the other-but without deter-
mining which one. It is the repugnancy and inconsistency
that demonstrates his error, and not the superior credi-
bility of the prior statement. Thus, we do not necessarily
accept his former statement as replacing his present one;
the one merely neutralizes the other as a trustworthy one."
This view has been followed by the majority of courts,"
including the Montana Supreme Court.' In support of this
doctrine, it has been propounded that to give any other effect
to such extra-judicial utterances would be violative of the
Hearsay Rule."
In State v. Jolly' the Montana Supreme Court held that
such statements may have affirmative testimonial value. A
'Southern Railway Company v. Gray (1916) 241 U. S. 33. 60 L. Ed.
1030; Woody v. Utah P. and L. Co. (1939) (C. C. A. 10th, 1931) 54 F.
(2d) 220; New York Life Insurance Company v. Bacalls (1938) (C. C.
A. 5th. 1938) 94 F. (2d) 200; Minor v. State (1924) 162 Ark 136, 248
S. W. 121: Albert v. McKay and Co. (1917) 174 Cal. 451, 163 P. 666;
Patton v. People (1946) 114 Colo. 534, 168 P. (2d) 266; Davis v. State
(1923) 86 Fla. 103, 97 So. 350: Perdue v. State (1906) 126 Ga. 112, 54
S. E. 820: Ritter v. People (1889) 130 Ill. 255, 22 N. E. 605: Hogan v.
State (1921) 191 Ind. 675, 133 N. E. 1: Dippert v. State (1929) 220
Ind. 483, 164 N. E. 626; Brown v. Commonwealth (1920) 188 Ky. 814,
224 S. W. 362: Manning v. Carberry (1899) 172 Mass. 432, 52 N. E.
521; Rankin v. Brockton Public Market (1926) 257 Mass. 6, 153 N. E.
97; People v. Miner (1905) 138 Mich. 200, 101 N. W. 536; People v.
Nemeth (1932) 258 Mich. 682, 242 N. W. 808: State v. Johnson (1867)
12 Minn. 488: Simms v. Forbes (1905) 86 Miss. 412, 38 So. 546; State
v. Baker (1896) 186 Mo. 74, 37 S. W. 810; Zimmerman v. Bank (1899)
59 Neb. 23. 80 N. W. 54: State v. Guida (1937) 118 N. J. 289. 192 A.
445; Balding v. Andrews (1903) 12 N. D. 267, 96 N. W. 305; Kent v.
State (1884) 42 Ohio St. 433: ,State v. Chynoweth (1912) 41 Utah 354,
126 P. 302.
'State v. Kinghorn. See note 7, Supra; Wise v. Stagg (1933) 94 Moult.
321, 22 P (2d) 308: Monaghan v. Standard Motor Co. (1934) 96 Mont.
165, 29 P. (2d) 378: Stevens v. Woodmen of the World (1934) 105
Mont. 121, 71 P. (2d) 898: State v. Traufer (1940) 109 Mont. 275, 97
P. (2d) 436.
"3 WIGMORS, EVlmxNMC (3d ed. 1940) 51018, p. 687. "The prior state-
ment is primarily hearsay, because it is not offered assertively, i.e.
not testimonially. The Hearsay Rule simply forbids the use of extra-
Judicial utterances as credible testimonial assertions: the prior con-
tradiction is not offered as a testimonial assertion to be relied on.
It follows, therefore, that the use of Prior Self-Contraditions to dis-
credit is not obnoxious to the Hearsay Rule."
"See note 2, Supra.
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small minority of courts in other jurisdictions have also adopted
such a view.' Though he expresses that the orthodox view is the
majority opinion, Dean Wigmore has written:"
"It does not follow, however, that Prior Self-Contradic-
tions, when admitted, are to be treated as having no af-
firmative testimonial value, and any such credit is to be
strictly denied them in the mind of the tribunal. The only
ground for doing so would be the Hearsay Rule. But the
theory of the Hearsay Rule is that an extrajudicial state-
ment is rejected because it is made out of court by an ab-
sent person not subject to cross-examination. Here how-
ever ... the witness is present and subject to cross-exami-
nation. There is ample opportunity to test him as to the
basis for his former statement. The whole process of the
Hearsay Rule has been already satisfied. Hence there is
nothing to prevent the tribunal from given such testi-
monial credit to the extrajudicial statement as it may seem
to deserve."
The same author, in discussing the Hearsay Rule has said:
"The most important objection to admission of hearsay
as affirmative proof is that the declarant is not available
for cross-examination and the court and the jury are with-
out the opportunity to observe his demeanor on the
stand. "
This statement implies that the availability of the witness
for cross-examination erases this objection.
In a footnote referred to in a discussion of the view, that
prior contradictory statements may be treated as substantive
evidence, Dean Wigmore states the following:"
"The orthodox view was approved in the first edition of
this Treatise. Further reflection, however, has shown the
present writer that the natural and correct solution is the
one set forth in the text above."
Another author' has indicated that a further objection to
the orthodox rule is that it is, by its very nature, practically
impossible to enforce. That it is an extremely difficult task
2Stewart v. Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co. (1925) ( C. C. A. let, 1925) 137
F. (2d) 527; Dicarle v. U. S. (1925) (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) 6 F. (2d)
884; Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Ry. Co. v. Kulp(1939) (C. C. A. 8th, 1909) 102 F. (2d) 852; Thomas v. State (1921)
200 Ala. 416, 90 So. 295; Rowe v. Goldberg Film Delivery Lines(1937) 50 Ariz. 349. 72 P. (2d) 432: Pulitzer v. Chapman (1935) 387
Mo. 298. 85 S. W. (2d) 400: People v. Kelly (1889) 113 N. Y. 647, 21
N. E. 122.
'03 Wimox, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) 51018, p. 688.
"5 W OMal, EVIDiNCE (3d ed, 1940) 51363.
"See note 22, Supra,
6 JoNas, EVnCE (2d ed, 1926) 52414, p. 4769.
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for a jury to obey the admonition of the court to consider the
evidence for one purpose but to disregard it for all others.
While neither the Montana Court in the Jolly case, nor
Dean Wigmore express any limitation upon the unorthodox
rule, it is significant that the courts without stating any limita-
tion, have in fact applied one. The cases in which prior self-
contradictory statements have been given substantive value
are cases in which the contradictory statements were either in
affidavit from, " a deposition," an official report,' or a state-
ment admittedly uttered by the witness.' Where the witness
has denied making the statement, and where the proof that he
did make it rests in parol evidence, the courts have refused to
apply the rule. Thus in Batchoff v. Craney," decided by the
Montana Court after the Jolly case, the court had before it
what it regarded as a prior contradictory statement," The
court followed the Peterson' and Stagg" cases and held that a
prior inconsistent statement had no substantive value. The
court did not refer to the Jolly case in the opinion, which was
written by the justice who had dissented in the Jolly case, and
presumably did not intend to over-rule that case.
These cases can be harmonized only on the basis of the
limitation suggested. In the absence of such a limitation the
hearsay rule would be almost completely ineffective, since if
substantive value can be given oral statements made cut of
court by a witness who denies having made them, and notwith-
standing the proof of such statements by oral testimony, then
any case can be proven by hearsay evidence once a witness for
the opposition has taken the stand.
In those cases where the witness being impeached is be-
fore the court, subject to cross-examination, and has either ad-
mitted prior contradictory statements or writings exist as
proof of them, it is questionable whether the orthodox view
should be retained. Robert T. Pantzer.
'Stewart v. Baltimore and Ohio By. Co., See note 21, Supra; State v.
Jolly, See note 2, Supra.
"Puliter v. Chapman, See note 21, Supra.
"Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Ry. Co. v. Kulp, See note
21, Supra.
nDicarlo v. U. S.; Thomas v. State: People v. Kelly; See note 21, Supra.
6(1946) ........ Mont ......... 172 P. (2d) 308.
"It is interesting to note that in the Batchoff case the court failed to
notice that statements made by a party to the law suit are admissions
and as such are admissable as substantive evidence. (R.C.M. 1935
§10531, Sub-Sec. 2: Carey v. Guest (1927) 78 Mont. 415, 258 P. 238.)
If the courts language in the Batchoff case states the law of Montana
then the admissions exception to the hearsay rule has been abolished.
"State v. Peterson (1936) 102 Mont. 495, 59 P. (2d) 61.
'Wise v. Stagg, See note 18, Supra.
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